Research

Dissertation Project (In progress)

Who Benefits from Federal Programs? Depends on the State and Program

My book-style my dissertation project investigates how policymaking power is shared between national and state leaders in the implementation of federal programs. Researchers and policymakers have claimed that the expansion of federal programs over the last several decades has come at the expense of state leeway, while others argue that national leaders are unable to hold states accountable to associated federal requirements. Thus, whether federal or state governments claim more power in the implementation of federal programs remains an unanswered question for both scholars and practitioners. My dissertation examines this question in the context of states’ decisions of who to identify as program recipients, decisions which have meaningful effects on the experiences of individuals with the program and the overall goals it advances.

When allocating federal programs, I argue that state leaders want to both retain valuable federal resources and respond to their constituents’ wishes. But these incentives are often in tension. That is, the recipients federal lawmakers’ intended to target are often not the same recipients who would help state leaders accomplish their electoral goals. Thus, I expect states will be most supportive of federal lawmakers’ goals when their electoral incentives are aligned and when explicit federal requirements encourage such alignment. State leaders’ ability to balance these competing incentives, though, is more challenging as program complexity increases. Thus, I expect state bureaucratic capacity will moderate the ability of state leaders to achieve their electoral incentives when implementing more complicated programs. In three empirical chapters, I test this theory by examining the implementation of national programs in three different policy areas including education, economic development, and transportation. This project has multiple implications regarding the study of federal programs, state executives’ policymaking power, and the allocation of government programs 

Working Papers

Are Federal Programs Constraining? Depends on the State

In 2023, the federal government provided state and local governments more than $1 trillion to implement national programs, continuing a decades-long upward trend. While some researchers claim this expansion diminished state policymaking power, others question whether states are held accountable to programmatic requirements, and thus, if they are constrained. Whether federal or state governments claim more power over national programs, therefore, remains an unanswered question. Accordingly, this paper develops a new theory explaining states’ selection of federal program recipients. I argue that state executives comply with federal requirements to avoid future retribution, and such choices constrain their available options. Among compliant options, however, state leaders select procedures that best support their electoral goals. I find support for this theory using a dataset on states’ identification of low-performing schools. Overall, this study reveals that federalism allows both federal and state leaders to have a meaningful role in shaping national policy.

Interest Groups and Constituent Preferences: How State Political Environments Shape the Implementation of Federal Programs

In recent years, states have experienced two parallel trends, a rapid growth in the scale of federal programs they are responsible for implementing and a dramatic expansion in the number of interest groups seeking to shape their decisions. These trends are not independent, but extant literature has largely not considered how they interact. This paper begins to do so by examining how interest groups shape state implementation of federal programs. I argue that state executives are responsive to organized interests. However, their competing incentives to prioritize the welfare of their electoral allies and their alignment (or lack thereof) with their legislature moderates how they respond. I find support for this theory using a dataset on states’ identification of economically distressed communities. Overall, this study reveals that American federalism means that national policies are shaped, in part, by state politics.

Works in Progress (Related Research Projects)

State Strategic Planning for Federal Programs: Does complexity complicate politics?

Presidential Policymaking through Federal Grants: Lessons from a Study of Department of Education Competitive Grants 

Winners and Losers of Grant Funding: Investigating Factors Influencing State Grant Allocations 

Executive-Agency Relations and State Agency Budgets: How does the design of agencies affect gubernatorial treatment of those agencies?

State Legislatures and Regulatory Activity: To what extent are lawmakers in control? (with Sharece Thrower and Alex Bolton)

Governors and Executive Branches: The Role of Differences in Intra-Executive Relations in Shaping State Regulatory Activity  (with Sharece Thrower and Alex Bolton)

Public Writings

2024. “Implementation and Impact of tnAchieves Coaching in Tennessee Community Colleges”. TN Education Research Alliance. (with James Gurthrie)